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The champions of the property rights movement claim that they are fighting to restore the original 
understanding of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They invoke James Madison and 
other founding fathers as support for proposed statutes that require the federal government to 
pay property owners when it prevents them from harming the environment or jeopardizing the 
survival of endangered species. Wetlands regulation, it is often said, "takes" property by 
diminishing its value, and the founders adopted the Takings Clause to ensure that, when 
government regulations diminished the value of property, the owner would receive compensation. 
Increasing numbers of lawsuits are being filed on the same theory. Established Supreme Court 
standards for resolving takings claims, litigants contend, are at odds with the founders' belief that 
property ownership was a natural right that the government could never limit. These suits urge 
courts to return to the founders' vision, and claim that, once that vision is revived, the judiciary will 
routinely invalidate local land use and environmental protection standards. 
Widely shared and forcefully repeated, this conception of the original understanding has come to 
play a central role in the debate about the Takings Clause. But it is demonstrably and 
dramatically wrong. The original understanding of the Takings Clause was, very simply, that the 
federal government had to compensate the property owner when it physically took property --
such as when it took land to build a fort. The clause did not require compensation for regulations 
under any circumstances. Property rights advocates ignore the plain language of the clause, the 
evidence about what the founders and other Americans in the early republic thought the clause 
actually meant, and the founders' views about property and democratic government. Claiming to 
rely on history, property rights advocates embrace, instead, a myth. 
Despite the public prominence of the property rights argument, there is actually nothing novel or 
particularly controversial about the conclusion that the Takings Clause was limited to physical 
seizures. With some notable exceptions, prominent legal scholars of all shades of political 
opinion--including such leading conservatives as former judge Robert Bork and former Solicitor 
General Charles Fried--support the conclusion that the property rights argument has no plausible 
foundation in the original understanding of the Takings Clause. Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court 
Justice who most consistently argues for a broad reading of the Takings Clause, has 
acknowledged that until well into the twentieth century "it was generally understood that the 
Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation' of property or [its] functional equivalent...." 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1114 (1992). The only remarkable 
aspect of the original understanding of the Takings Clause is how rarely the original 
understanding of this clause is taken into account in political and legal debates over property 
rights. 
Plain Language 
Despite all the controversy about its meaning, the language of the Takings Clause--"nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"--is perfectly straightforward. 
Compensation is necessary only when property is "taken." In other words, the only time when 
government must compensate the property owner is when it physically seizes property. The text 
does not require compensation when regulations diminish the value of property. Indeed, the 
clause does not even mention regulations. 
Proponents of a broad reading of the Takings Clause counter that, at the time of the ratification of 
the Takings Clause, "property" sometimes meant "anything of value." Thus, according to this 
view, whenever government diminishes the value of property through regulation, the Takings 
Clause can properly be read to require payment of compensation. 
The problem with this view is that it ignores a critical part of the clause, the word "taken." "Take" 
means, and meant at the time the Fifth Amendment was ratified, "physically seize," not "diminish 
in value." All the debate among judges, scholars, policy-makers, and politicians about precisely 
what the Takings Clause means tends to obscure this obvious point, but it can be illustrated with 
a simple example. If I tell my daughter that she cannot play with her ball in the house, she has 
lost something of value--the right to play with the ball in the house. I have regulated what she can 
do with the ball, but I haven't "taken" it. She is still free to play with it outside. I only "take" her ball 
when I physically seize it. Only a child immersed in the literature of the property rights movement 
would argue otherwise. The plain language of the Takings Clause is to the same effect. Even if 
the word "property" is read to cover anything of value, compensation is owed only when property 
is "taken." Regulations, by their nature, are not "takings." 
Original Understanding 
The evidence of how the clause was originally understood leads to the same conclusion as 
analysis of its language: the Takings Clause applied only to physical takings. 
While property rights advocates sometimes argue as if the founders believed that the Takings 
Clause was the central feature of the Constitution (or at least the Bill of Rights), the historical 
reality is almost the exact opposite. The state ratifying conventions that considered the 
Constitution proposed almost two hundred constitutional amendments. Not one, however, 
proposed a takings clause. The clause is part of the Constitution, not because there was a 
national demand for it, but because James Madison, the author of the Bill of Rights, unilaterally 
included it among the amendments he proposed in 1789. Madison did not explain what the 
clause meant when he presented it to Congress, and no debate in Congress about its meaning -- 
if there was any debate -- has been preserved. The language of Madison's proposal shows that 
he was concerned only with physical seizures: "No person shall be...obliged to relinquish his 
property, where it may be necessary for public use, without just compensation." This wording was 
altered in Congress to the current constitutional text. In the absence of recorded debates, we 
don't know why the change was made, but it is clear that the language eventually adopted was, 
like the language of Madison's initial proposal, the language of physical seizure. Indeed, the 
principal change was to highlight the physical action by the government. The focus is no longer 
on the individual's "relinquish[ing]"; it is on the government's "tak[ing]." 
St. George Tucker, a Virginia judge, politician and legal educator, provided the first clear 
statement of the clause's meaning in 1803 when he wrote what became the early republic's 
preeminent constitutional law treatise. In that treatise, he observed that the Takings Clause "was 
probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the 
army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practiced during the 
revolutionary war." Thus, according to Tucker, the purpose of the clause was to require 
compensation when the military seized civilian goods. 
The other important early statements concerning the clause's scope are Madison's. In a 1792 
newspaper essay criticizing Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's economic policies, 
Madison attacked "arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies [that] deny to part of [the 
nation's] citizens . . . free use of their faculties." Madison continued:  
"If there be a government then which prides itself in maintaining the inviolability of property; which 
provides that none shall be taken directly even for public use without indemnification to the 
owner, and yet...which indirectly violates their property, in their actual possessions, in the labor 
that acquires their very subsistence, and in the hallow remnant of time which ought to relieve their 
fatigues and sooth their cares, ...such a government is not a pattern for the United States." 
Significantly, even as Madison in his essay is defending property interests, he demonstrates that 
the Takings Clause's prohibition is limited. In Madison's words, the clause provides that property 
"shall [not] be taken directly." It does not reach "indirect[ ]" violations - the "arbitrary restrictions, 
exemptions and violations" that Madison warns against, not as a matter of constitutional law, but 
as a matter of public policy. 
Madison's other most significant writing about the Takings Clause reflects the same view of the 
clause's meaning. In a letter to an antislavery advocate, Madison proposed that the federal 
government purchase all slaves in order to free them. He observed, "Whatever may be the 
intrinsic character of that property [slavery], it is one known to the constitution and, as such, could 
not be constitutionally taken away without compensation." Again, compensation is necessary for 
Madison because the Government has physically "taken away" "property." 
In drafting the clause, it appears that Madison sought to address very particular concerns. One 
type of government action during the revolutionary era that troubled him was the seizure of 
loyalist land. Such seizure had occurred on a scale of epic proportions: Loyalist property worth 
more than twenty million dollars--one tenth the value of real property in the country--was 
confiscated. In addition, as a Virginian and a slaveowner, he was worried that in the new republic 
the free states would band together in Congress and enact legislation that emancipated slaves 
without compensation. The Takings Clause, with its narrow ban on "direct" takings of physical 
property, precisely remedied these two problems. 
In historical context, the narrow scope of the Takings Clause is hardly surprising. The clause 
provided greater protection for the property owner than the property owner had traditionally 
received. England's Magna Carta did not require compensation for government seizure of land. It 
only required compensation when the government took personal property. Thus, crown officials 
were barred from "tak[ing] anyone's grain or other chattels, without immediately paying the 
money." Magna Carta, Art. 28. In contrast, the sole limitation on government seizure of land was 
one of procedural regularity: "No free man shall be dispossessed...except by the legal judgement 
of his peers or by the law of the land." Magna Carta, Art. 39. Early colonial charters were similarly 
limited in scope. Only the Massachusetts Body of Liberty, adopted in 1641, required 
compensation when personal property was taken. No colonial charter required compensation for 
the seizure of land. While property owners, in practice, commonly were paid when their land was 
seized, no colony had a constitutional obligation to do so, and, in fact, compensation was not 
always paid. Strikingly, except for Massachusetts, no colony paid compensation when it built 
roads on undeveloped land. 
No colonial charter barred regulation that diminished the value of property, and colonial 
governments adopted innumerable regulations that constrained the use of property. In some 
respects colonial regulations, particularly pertaining to the permitted use and intensity of 
development, appear relatively rudimentary compared to modern regulations; other colonial 
regulations appear relatively stringent from a modern perspective. Land use statutes throughout 
the colonies limited where certain businesses--such as bakeries, slaughterhouses, and stills--
could be located and what crops farmers could grow. Colonial laws regulated the permitted 
density of development; for example, a Connecticut building requirement limited the dispersion of 
development within the community, while a New Jersey law prohibited the subdivision of home 
lots to prevent overcrowding. Other colonial ordinances, such as in the colonies of New 
Amsterdam and Virginia, explicitly regulated the aesthetic features of development. An early 
Massachusetts Bay ordinance prohibited the construction of a dwelling unit more than half a mile 
from the meeting house. 
Many colonial laws imposed affirmative obligations on residents to use their property for some 
specific purpose to advance the overall interests of the community. A Plymouth colony ordinance 
required those with rights in valuable minerals to exploit their rights or forfeit them. A Maryland 
law required owners of good mill sites to develop the sites or run the risk of losing their property 
to someone else who would develop the site. Similarly, when land was not developed or bridges 
fell into disuse, colonial governments took these properties from their owners and transferred 
them to someone else. Such forced transfers often occurred when the owner's initial grant 
contained provisions requiring use, but not always. New York's Governor Bellomont, for example, 
seized undeveloped land and, when confronted with the argument that he was not empowered to 
do so because the land grants had not explicitly required settlement, responded that the 
argument was inconsistent with royal authority and was "very presumptuous and unnatural." 
The first state constitutions enacted after independence was declared did not require 
compensation when the government seized property. Instead, they left the decision to 
compensate or not to legislative discretion. As a Pennsylvania court stated, citizens "were bound 
to contribute as much of it [land] as, by the laws of the country, were deemed necessary for the 
public convenience." M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362, 373 (Pa. 1802). Similarly, South 
Carolina's Attorney General, in prevailing over a claimant who sought compensation for the taking 
of unimproved land, argued that such taking without payment was "one of the inherent 
prerogatives of the majesty of the people." 
A compensation requirement began to win constitutional recognition during the revolutionary era, 
but only in a very limited way. Vermont - not one of the original thirteen states - broke from 
precedent in 1777 when it adopted the first constitutional provision requiring compensation 
"whenever any particular man's property is taken for the use of the public." Massachusetts 
adopted a similar restriction in its 1780 constitution. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was the 
third and final revolutionary era document to contain a compensation requirement. These 
constitutional provisions, however, were understood narrowly. None was read as a limit on 
government regulation. Indeed, an early court case construed the Northwest Ordinance's 
provision as applying only to military seizures, Renthrop v. Bourg, 4 Mart. 97, 132-33 (La. 1816), 
thus adopting a view similar to Tucker's view of the Takings Clause. 
Until late in the nineteenth century, judicial constructions of the Takings Clause and of similar 
state constitutional provisions were consistently narrow. As one treatise writer observed in 1857, 
"It seems to be settled that, to be entitled to protection under this clause [the Takings Clause], the 
property must be actually taken in the physical sense of the word." Similarly, the Supreme Court 
declared in 1871: 
"[The Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation. ...It 
has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm 
and loss to individuals. A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon 
individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may 
destroy the worth of contracts. But whoever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be 
changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared?" 
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). In short, the Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause did not prevent regulations and statutes from restricting how property could be used nor 
did it prevent them from diminishing the value of property. The clause applied only to "a direct 
appropriation." 
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence has dramatically departed from the original understanding. 
Since the 1890's, the Court has applied the clause to regulations (although its reading of the 
clause has still been much narrower than the reading favored by property rights advocates). 
Thus, the idea that regulations can violate the Takings Clause has a historical pedigree. But it is a 
pedigree that can be traced back only to the late nineteenth century, not to the framers of the 
Constitution. 
Political Values 
Finally, the limited scope of the Takings Clause reflects the basic political values of the founding 
fathers. Most fundamentally, the founders believed in democratic self-governance. They believed 
that, given the proper institutional framework, the people of this country could govern themselves 
wisely and well. The structure of the government the founders created embodied such a 
framework, one designed to ensure that debate on proposals would be fair, that elected officials 
who considered legislation were responsible leaders, and that statutes enacted into law enjoyed 
strong support -- either from both houses of Congress and the President or two-thirds of both 
houses. 
The Takings Clause was drafted narrowly, not because the founding fathers cared too little about 
property rights, but because they cared so much about representative democracy. The founders 
did not bring regulations within the ambit of the Takings Clause because they believed it was the 
appropriate responsibility of democratic decision-makers to balance individual property interests 
against other community interests. Both in its wording and its theory of governance, the 
Constitution starts with "We the People," and the original meaning of the Takings Clause can only 
be understood in that larger context. 
Proponents of a broad reading of the Takings Clause offer an alternative account. They assert 
that the founders were followers of the philosopher John Locke and therefore committed to the 
principle that the state can never diminish an individual's property. Sophisticated adherents of this 
view sometimes acknowledge that the founders favored certain statutes that caused the value of 
some private property to diminish. But, these proponents argue, the founders simply failed to see 
the tension between, say, their acceptance of state regulation in some circumstances and their 
general commitment to a Lockean conception of property. If we are to honor the original 
understanding, these proponents continue, we should honor the founders' general commitments, 
not their occasional blind spots. 
This account is bad history. To start with, it misreads Locke, who did not see property rights as 
absolute. Far more important, regardless of whether or not the proponents of a broad reading of 
the Takings Clause have misread Locke, they have certainly misread the founders and their 
views on property. The founders were profoundly influenced by republicanism, the school of 
thought that contends that the essential role of the state is to promote individual virtue and 
commitment to the common good. Republicans treasured the institution of private property. 
Property gave the individual the independence he needed to participate responsibly in politics 
without fear of economic retribution. Because property was valued as a means, rather than as the 
end of the state, however, republicans believed that legislators could limit property interests in 
order to advance the common good. 
The constitutionalization of a compensation requirement, first in several state constitutions, the 
Northwest Ordinance, and then in the Bill of Rights, reflected a break from this view, but only in a 
very limited way. During the revolutionary era, a range of Americans concluded that - with respect 
to the seizure of physical property - additional protection of private property was needed, even as 
their specific concerns varied dramatically. The movement for a compensation requirement began 
in Vermont and reflected the peculiarities of that state's history. The area that became Vermont 
had originally been a part of New Hampshire and then, in 1764, the English government had 
shifted the area to New York. The New York legislature subsequently invalidated the New 
Hampshire land titles. The Vermonters who declared their independence from New York included 
a Takings Clause in their constitution, presumably because their central grievance was the New 
York government's attempt to seize their land. Tucker's statement about the Fifth Amendment, as 
well as the court's holding in Renthrop interpreting the Northwest Ordinance, suggest that others 
supported constitutionalizing a compensation requirement because of their opposition to military 
seizure of civilian property. Madison's various political writings suggest that he was motivated by 
still other concerns: he feared that, because a majority would own neither land nor slaves, the 
interests of landowners and slaveowners were property interests that the political process was 
particularly unlikely to consider fairly. Moreover, while no one seems to have voiced objection to 
the constitutionalization of a compensation requirement in the Takings Clause, there was not a 
strong movement in favor of it either. As noted, it is the one clause in the Bill of Rights that no 
state requested. 
It is thus wrong to read the Takings Clause as embodying a fundamental rejection of majoritarian 
decision-making or republicanism. Its adoption reflected, instead, a congruence of concerns 
relating to the perceived need to protect particular forms of real property from state seizure. While 
it is true, as proponents of a broad reading of the Takings Clause often point out, that some of the 
actions of revolutionary era state governments - such as their confiscation of loyalist land - 
caused many of the founders to fear what unconstrained majorities, in the absence of appropriate 
checks and balances, might do, the founders were also worried about what wealthy property-
owners might do if they were not controlled. Thus, even a staunch conservative such as 
Pennsylvania's John Dickinson could declare at the constitutional convention that he "doubted the 
policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth [and] had always 
understood that a veneration for poverty & virtue, were the objects of republican encouragement." 
The scope of the Takings Clause was limited, then, to physical seizures because most of the 
founders fundamentally believed in republicanism and believed, as well, that in most contexts 
majoritarian decision-making could appropriately limit property claims to advance the common 
good. John Adams described laws that caused "frequent division of landed property" as one of 
the five principal sources of liberty in New England. Madison in Federalist Ten recognized that 
governmental decisions necessarily involved creating economic winners and losers among 
competing interests: "A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a 
moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations.... The 
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern 
legislation...." Benjamin Franklin, however, offered perhaps the strongest statement of the relation 
between private property claims and the public good. He wrote, "Private Property...is a Creature 
of Society, and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it, 
even to its last Farthing; its contribution to the public Exigencies are...to be considered...the 
Return of an obligation previously received, or the payment of a just debt." The limited scope of 
the Takings Clause was not, as proponents of a broad reading of the clause argue, the product of 
the founders' blindness. It was a product of their beliefs. 
 
History, of course, is not destiny, and just because the founders intended the Takings Clause to 
have a narrow scope does not necessarily mean that it should be given an identical reading 
today. 
Ultimately, what one makes of the founders' original understanding of the Takings Clause 
depends upon one's approach to constitutional interpretation in general. An advocate of strict 
adherence to the actual original meaning of a constitutional provision will be forced by the history 
outlined above to adopt a reading of the Takings Clause that excludes governmental regulation. 
Others, for example, could argue that the animating principle behind the Takings Clause should 
be sensitively applied in twentieth century America, taking account of changed social and 
economic circumstances. Others might pursue other routes of constitutional interpretation. All 
examinations of this important and controversial subject would benefit, however, by accurate 
recognition that the founders never intended the Takings Clause to reach government regulation 
at all. As its name indicates, the Takings Clause applied only to takings. 
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